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Trends in Federal Funds Rate Volatility
Spence Hilton
The behavior of the fed funds rate—a key monetary policy target and a benchmark for short-term
interest rates—is closely watched by many market participants. After a decade marked by
periodic bouts of high volatility in the funds rate, volatility has declined sharply since 2001.
An analysis of the major factors influencing the rate’s behavior shows that some of the forces
behind the current fall in volatility first emerged in response to the earlier increases.
T
he overnight federal funds rate is the operating
target of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) when it sets the
stance of monetary policy.This rate is also a key bench-
mark for interest rates in the U.S. short-term money
market.Consequently,the rate’s behavior is of consider-
able interest to more than just participants in the federal
funds market.
In recent years,volatility in the federal funds rate has
fallen markedly. The drop follows a decade in which
volatility surged in extended bouts. In this edition of
Current Issues,we shed light on the major factors influenc-
ing federal funds rate volatility since 1989. Our review
places the rate’s recent volatility decline and current levels
of volatility in historical perspective.It also underscores
how developments both within and outside the direct con-
trol of the Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (the Desk),the group charged with implement-
ing monetary policy,have influenced the behavior of the
policy rate.
We begin by explaining the nature of the target federal
funds rate and the framework for implementing monetary
policy.The measures of rate volatility used in this article
are described,as is the importance of what are known as
high-payment-flow days in analyses of the behavior of the
funds rate.Next,we examine the rate’s behavior over two
periods, 1989-2000 and 2001–midyear 2005.1 For each
period,we identify the main forces contributing to volatil-
ity.Significantly,we show that some of the forces behind
the recent decline in volatility first emerged in response to
rises in the earlier period.Prospects for future volatility in
the federal funds rate are also considered.
Managing the Federal Funds Rate
In the federal funds market, depository institutions
(banks) operating in the United States directly borrow
from,and lend to,one another on an unsecured basis the
balances (reserves) that they hold in accounts at the
Federal Reserve.2 The FOMC directs the Desk to use open
market operations to maintain the overnight federal funds
rate “at an average of around”a specified rate,commonly
referred to as the target rate. Since February 1994, the
FOMC has publicly announced changes in the target rate.
In the five or so preceding years,the Committee did not
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formally target the funds rate.Nonetheless,it established
“desired”rate levels internally,which in turn were “signaled”
to the market through open market operations.The Desk
sought to attain these desired rate levels much as it does now
with the announced targets.3
The Desk’s basic operating procedures for managing the
federal funds rate are well documented.4 It influences the
rate indirectly by adjusting the supply of reserve balances
through open market operations. Two components of the
framework for implementing monetary policy that are
important for our discussion are the structure of banks’total
requirements to hold reserve balances at the Federal Reserve
and the Fed’s discount window lending arrangements.5
Banks hold reserve balances at the Federal Reserve in
order to meet various requirements,which are fixed for two-
week intervals called maintenance periods.The structure of
total requirements to hold balances at the Fed comprises
reserve requirements,which are set by the Fed in proportion
to a bank’s deposit liabilities,less the bank’s holdings of cash
on its premises, and a contractual form of requirements
known as clearing balance requirements,which are set volun-
tarily by each bank.Reserve requirements are not remuner-
ated.In contrast,banks earn income credits on balances held
to meet their clearing balance requirements at a rate linked
to the federal funds rate.However,these credits can be used
only to pay for certain Federal Reserve priced services used
by banks,a restriction that effectively limits the level of a
clearing balance requirement that a bank would ever con-
tract to hold.6A bank may hold balances in any daily pattern
consistent with holding a cumulative total over a two-week
maintenance period that satisfies its requirements,as long as
the bank ends no day overdrawn on its Fed account.A bank
that meets or exceeds its requirements before a period ends
is considered to be “locked into”holding excess balances,and
it will attempt to hold a level of balances as close to zero as
possible on each day remaining in the period.
The Federal Reserve’s discount window—another com-
ponent of the monetary policy framework—is available as a
source of reserve supply in the event that a shortage would
otherwise leave banks overdrawn at the end of a day or short
of their requirements at the end of a period.However,the
terms under which discount window loans are extended
severely limit the use of this facility.Under present arrange-
ments,a bank in generally sound financial condition with
sufficient collateral may borrow on a short-term basis
directly from the Fed at a discount window facility called
the primary credit facility,at a “discount”rate normally set
100 basis points above the target level of the federal funds
rate.The primary credit facility has been in operation since
January 2003.Previously,when the adjustment credit facility
had been in place,the discount rate typically had been set
slightly below the target federal funds rate,and banks’bor-
rowing behavior was controlled by more administrative
measures.
To avoid being overdrawn at the Fed or falling short of its
requirements,a bank would be willing to pay a rate as high
as the discount rate in the funds market so as not to borrow
at the discount window.Conversely,a bank would be willing
to lend in the market at rates as low as 0 percent to avoid
holding excess reserves.Multiday maintenance periods and
high levels of requirements can dampen federal funds rate
volatility because they widen the daily range of reserves a
bank may hold consistent with its maintenance period
requirements.
Measures of Federal Funds Rate Behavior
Most trades between large banking institutions in the fed-
eral funds market are arranged through a handful of brokers.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York collects data on the
overnight trades arranged each day by the major brokers in
this market and uses the data to calculate a volume-
weighted daily average (“effective”) rate and other measures
of rate behavior.For this analysis,a complete set of daily
federal funds rate observations from January 1989 through
June 2005 was compiled from this source.
Federal funds rate behavior is most commonly measured
in one of two ways: the deviation of the effective funds rate
from the target rate (or its absolute value) is widely used to
gauge average performance of the rate over an entire day
relative to the operating target;the intraday standard deviation
of rates around the daily effective rate is the most compre-
hensive measure of rate volatility within a day.
Both measures tend to become elevated on so-called
high-payment-flow days—normally the first,middle,and
final business day of each month.On these days,the flow of
financial transactions that affect the distribution of reserves
held at the Fed by banks is much heavier and more uncertain
than usual.Accordingly,we examine funds rate behavior on
high-payment-flow days and on all other days separately.To
obtain summary statistics for this analysis, we calculate
median values for these measures over semiannual periods.7
Federal Funds Rate Behavior:1989-2000
The Decline in Total Requirements
During the 1990s,the decline in total requirements was the
most significant development that affected the behavior of
the funds rate (Chart 1).The drop came in several waves and
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had more than one immediate cause.Reserve requirements
fell abruptly around year-end 1990, when the Federal
Reserve’s Board of Governors eliminated requirements on all
nontransaction deposits,which had been 3 percent of the
value of these deposits.Reserve requirements again fell in
April 1992,when the Board reduced from 12 percent to
10 percent the maximum marginal requirement ratio on
transaction deposits.Within a couple of years,the impact of
these cuts was offset by the effects of falling interest rates on
the growth of bank deposits subject to reserve requirements,
as well as by an increase in contractual clearing balance
requirements at large banks seeking to blunt the effects of
lower reserve requirements.8 Afterward, over a period of
roughly three years beginning in 1996,the rapid adoption by
commercial banks of retail “sweep”programs—designed to
reduce the level of bank deposits subject to reserve require-
ments,which earn no interest—brought total requirements
down to historically low levels.By 1999,banks had largely
exhausted their opportunities for reducing reserve require-
ments further through sweep programs.
The declines in requirements in turn were associated
with higher funds rate volatility.9When lower requirements
are in place,swings in a bank’s reserve position at the Fed of
a given amount are more likely to leave the bank either over-
drawn or in peril of accumulating unwanted excess reserves.
Attempts by banks to avoid these outcomes can place
upward or downward pressure on market rates. Intraday
standard deviations jumped in 1991 and remained high the
following year for high-payment-flow days and all other days
before falling back (Chart 2),likely helped by the subsequent
rise in requirements brought on by a decline in interest rates.
Intraday rate volatility again rose as the use of sweep pro-
grams gained momentum starting in 1996,and it remained
somewhat elevated on high-payment-flow days and all other
days for a few years as total requirements continued to fall.
The impact of falling requirements on absolute devia-
tions of the daily effective funds rate from the target is
shown in Chart 3. For high-payment-flow days, the daily
absolute deviations of the effective rate from the target
became quite elevated in 1991-93, receded a bit, and
returned to high levels from 1996 to 1998.Effective rates on
high-payment-flow days were typically well above the target.
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Notes: Total requirements are reserve requirements less applied vault cash plus 
clearing balance requirements. Figures for 2005 are through June 30.
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In contrast,for all other days,the increase in deviations of
the effective rate from the target was fairly muted,especially
in the 1996-98 period.Moreover,these deviations were more
evenly balanced above and below the target.In general,the
Desk’s ability on these days to keep the rate on average
around the target was not seriously impaired by lower
requirements,even as intraday rate volatility increased.
Responses to Rising Rate Volatility
The rise in federal funds rate volatility created by the decline
in requirements set in motion a number of responses both
within the Federal Reserve and among banks that mitigated
the extent ofthe rise and eventually contributed to a measur-
able fall in volatility.
In the 1990s, the Fed made several changes to the
accounting framework for the reserve maintenance period.
In 1992,it liberalized the rules that determine the portion of
reserve requirements in one period that a bank may defer
until the following period,or the portion of the next period’s
requirements that a bank may satisfy with excess reserves
held in the current period.By increasing the “carryover”lim-
its from 2 percent to 4 percent of the level of reserve require-
ments, the Fed provided banks with more flexibility to
address surprises to their reserve positions on maintenance
period settlement days without having to borrow or lend in
the funds market.
In 1998, the Fed adopted a lagged reserve accounting
structure, in which the level of reserve requirements in a
two-week maintenance period would be set and become
known before the period began.Previously,under the con-
temporaneous reserve accounting structure,which had been
in place since 1984,reserve requirements for a maintenance
period were based partly on a bank’s deposit liabilities
through the first twelve days of the two-week maintenance
period itself.This arrangement made it difficult to estimate
accurately reserve demand within a maintenance period.
At the same time,the Desk altered some of its daily inter-
vention practices.It became more sensitive to daily patterns
of reserve demand,instead of considering just the period-
average level of demand determined by the level of require-
ments.A measurable effect of this greater sensitivity to daily
reserve demand was a significant decrease,starting in 1996,
in the frequency with which the Desk stayed out of the mar-
ket and refrained from adjusting the supply of reserves
through temporary open market operations (Chart 4).The
Desk also started to collect daily reserve position reports
from a much larger number of individual banks (see table).
The main reason for obtaining this information was to iden-
tify banks that had inadvertently held more reserves than
were needed to meet their requirements before the last day
of a maintenance period, thereby becoming locked into
holding unwanted levels of excess reserves.As the incidence
and size of lock-ins grew as a result of the decline in require-
ments,it became more critical for the Desk to be aware of
their size in order to measure accurately the total level of
reserves needed over an entire maintenance period.10 By
examining the daily reserve position reports,the Desk also
developed a better basis for estimating the daily demand
preferences of banks.
Developments in the banking sector also served to limit
the rise in funds rate volatility associated with lower require-
ments,although the evidence here is more fragmentary and
anecdotal.Banks active in settling large financial payments on
their Fed account took measures to reduce the uncertainty of
these payment flows. Enhanced information systems for
tracking and anticipating payment flows were adopted by
institutions with complex organizational structures.11
Consolidation in the banking sector may also have improved
the overall efficiency with which banks anticipated large
4
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Note: There were about 252 business days each year.  
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payment flows. In addition, as we observed earlier, large
banks took advantage of the Fed’s existing, but largely
unused,contractual clearing balance program to increase
their total requirements.
Federal Funds Rate Behavior:2001–Midyear 2005
The Trend toward Lower Volatility
By 2000,most measures of rate volatility had returned to their
pre-1991 levels.Since then,measures of both intraday rate
volatility and daily absolute deviations of the effective rate
from the target have drifted steadily downward (Charts 2 and 3).
This decline in volatility is evident in the measures of rate
behavior for both high-payment-flow days and other days.
The fall in these measures can be attributed to several factors.
Certain developments that helped bring measured volatil-
ity down toward the end of the 1990s have subsequently
grown more pronounced,reducing volatility even more.The
number of large banking institutions from which the Desk
collects daily reserve reports has continued to expand,
enabling it to improve further its estimates of period-average
and daily demands for reserves (see table).This additional
information—along with the further decrease,albeit slight,
in the number of days on which the Desk has refrained from
adjusting reserve supply through open market operations
(Chart 4)—has allowed the Desk to accommodate daily
reserve demands better.
The low absolute value of the target federal funds rate has
helped reduce rate volatility through indirect and direct
channels.Indirectly,it has contributed to lower volatility by
stimulating growth in demand for transaction deposits at
banks subject to reserve requirements.A lower target funds
rate has also decreased the rate of return on reserves held to
meet contractual clearing balance requirements, thereby
increasing the level of clearing balance requirements that
would generate enough income credits for a bank to pay for all
the Federal Reserve priced services it uses.As a result,total
requirements rose from prevailing levels of around $13 billion
in early 2000 to more than $20 billion in 2004 (Chart 1).More
directly,with the target funds rate at historically low levels
through most of 2002-04,the magnitudes of the steepest
feasible downward moves in the rate were curtailed by the
0 percent lower bound on interest rates (Chart 5).12
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve’s establishment of a
primary credit facility in January 2003 appears to have con-
tributed to rate compression from the other direction,by setting
an effective upper bound on potential rate movements
(Chart 5).On only four days in the period from the facility’s
introduction to midyear 2005 did the federal funds rate
exceed the primary credit rate (and only by a modest
amount and for a small volume of trading).On several occa-
sions,upward spikes in the market rate halted exactly at the
rate on primary credit.Anecdotally,reserve managers indi-
cate that the primary credit facility has removed some of
their inhibitions about borrowing at the discount window.
However,in the year or so preceding the introduction of the
facility,the market rate rarely had risen as much as 100 basis
points above the target funds rate.Given the general absence
of market conditions that might lead to discount window
borrowing,it is difficult to be certain about the facility’s total
effect on the behavior of the funds rate.13
Recent Developments
Volatility in the federal funds rate picked up in the second
half of 2004.Intraday standard deviations were a bit higher
and daily deviations of the effective rate from the target were
somewhat greater than before,although both measures of
volatility rose only slightly over this period and for the most
part are still well below levels prevailing even just a few years
earlier (Charts 2 and 3).At least some of the increase in
volatility is likely attributable to the higher absolute levels of
the target funds rate,which unwound some of the compres-
sion in rates that occurred when the target rate was at its
lowest levels.Higher rates have also been accompanied by a
decline in the level of total requirements.
Also contributing to the observed rise in volatility over
the past half year has been the effect on the federal funds
rate of episodes of expected monetary policy tightening.In
maintenance periods in which a policy change was widely
expected,the funds rate tended to move toward the new tar-
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Note: Figures for 2005 are through June 30. 
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get in the days ahead of the actual change,as bank demand
for reserves within the maintenance period shifted to take
advantage of the anticipated rate change.These effects were
confined to the nine maintenance periods (out of twenty-
six) since mid-2004 in which a policy change occurred.In all
instances,expectations of a policy rate hike were nearly uni-
versal just ahead of each FOMC meeting,and the funds rate
was pressured up toward the expected higher target rate—
and away from the prevailing target—in the days of the
maintenance period leading up to each meeting.The Desk
has a limited ability to counteract the effects of these expec-
tations because banks can substitute reserve holdings
between different days of the same maintenance period.
Prospects
This article has examined the key factors influencing federal
funds rate volatility from 1989 to midyear 2005. Looking
ahead,we note that if interest rates were to move above current
levels, volatility may also increase further because the
potential range for interest rate movements in the federal
funds market will expand.In addition,because of the way in
which total requirements are currently structured,higher
interest rates could heighten volatility by further reducing
reserve requirements and clearing balance requirements.
However,even if intraday volatility and deviations of the
effective federal funds rate from the target were to rise under
these circumstances,volatility would likely retrace only a
portion of the decline recorded over the past four years
because other developments that have reduced volatility
would remain in place.These include the Federal Reserve’s
move to lagged accounting for reserve requirements, the
high frequency of intervention by the Desk, its improved
ability to estimate daily reserve demands,and banking sec-
tor trends that appear to have reduced bank uncertainty
associated with payment and settlement flows.Furthermore,
although its potential effect on rates has not been fully
tested,the Fed’s primary credit facility could mute any ten-
dency for rate volatility to increase.
Notes
1. We use year-end 2000 as our break point because it marks the onset of a
period of decline in most measures of federal funds rate volatility.
2. Although the federal funds market is largely an interbank market, govern-
ment securities dealers and certain federal government agencies that maintain
accounts at the Fed are active lenders in the market.
3. A gradual shift in operating procedures toward implicit adoption of a target
level for the federal funds rate occurred during the 1980s and was effectively
completed by 1989. See Meulendyke (1998, chap. 2) for a description of the
evolution of the FOMC’s operating targets.
4. An overview of the Desk’s operating practices is found in Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (2005, pp. 1-2); for a more detailed description, see Krieger
(2002, pp. 73-4).
5. Descriptions of these requirements and the administration of the discount
window are found in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2005,
chap. 3).
6. Further detail on the structure of total requirements, including clearing bal-
ance requirements, can be found in Bennett and Peristiani (2002). The authors
also describe the reductions in reserve requirement ratios and the effect of
retail sweep accounts in lowering the total level of requirements in the 1990s.
7. Individual daily outlier observations from the federal funds market some-
times significantly affect average values, even over semiannual time intervals.
Accordingly, our analysis uses median values because they provide a better
sense of the typical or prevailing levels for our measures of funds rate behav-
ior. However, median values may not always reflect some short-lived episodes
of heightened rate volatility.
8. The sensitivity of total requirements to the level of interest rates can be seen
from the inverse relationship between total requirements and the target funds
rate depicted in Chart 1.
9. The link between reductions in reserve requirements and federal funds rate
volatility is discussed in Bennett and Hilton (1997), Bennett and Peristiani
(2002), and Krieger (2002).
10. In the absence of this information and prior to the sizable declines in
requirements in the 1990s, the Desk implicitly assumed that lock-ins were not
significant. Thus, for a time as lock-ins became larger (as requirements
decreased) but still went unrecognized, there was a greater potential for the Desk
to underestimate final reserve needs late in a maintenance period.
11. Anecdotal reports from bankers suggest that these types of initiatives were
part of the general preparations made ahead of the century-date change.
12. By just limiting the potential size of any rate decline that could occur, a low
absolute level of rates might help reduce rate volatility on days when market par-
ticipants are uncertain about their prospects for accumulating excess reserves.
13. Under some circumstances, the impact on rate volatility of the shift to the
primary credit facility is ambiguous. The highest potential rate ever likely to
develop in the market may be lower under the primary credit facility arrange-
ment. However, market rates would normally have to be 100 basis points above
the target before a bank would choose to borrow at the discount window. In con-
trast, under the old discount window arrangements, some banks were willing to
borrow when market rates reached a level that was less than 100 basis points
above the target rate, especially if the amount borrowed was large. Other banks,
though, would not borrow until market rates had reached much higher levels.
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